As the political crisis in Zimbabwe spirals into bloodshed and chaos, its ruler, Robert Mugabe, seems to have endless tricks up his sleeve. Already he has stalled an election after probably losing the first round, used the state-controlled press to divert attention to the chronic issue of land control, and apparently had thugs beat opposition supporters. But one of his strategies seems likely to fail. In mid-April, South Africa's Transport Workers Union refused to unload a shipment of Chinese arms destined for Zimbabwe.
As this aborted arms shipment suggests, China's African honeymoon appears to be over. When President Hu Jintao embarked upon his first trip there, in 2004, African nations, flush with the romance of a first date, fell over themselves in welcome. China inked deal after deal: a $2.3 billion stake in a Nigerian offshore petroleum field; a $1.5 billion pact to upgrade Ethiopia's telecom system; massive investments in Angola, now China's largest source of oil imports. China won diplomatic victories, too, getting Chad, Malawi and Senegal to switch recognition from Taipei to Beijing in just the past three years. And in 2006, Beijing hosted a triumphant follow-up summit with nearly every African leader.
But the romance has cooled. Some African activists worry that Beijing still sometimes props up ancient autocrats like Mugabe. In nations with strong civil societies like South Africa, there is a growing realization that many Western firms train local workers and understand how to operate in a free political environment. Meanwhile, activists in places like Ethiopia and Namibia have condemned Chinese investment practices, including poor wages and importation of Chinese laborers. In one of the worst incidents, Zambia exploded in protest after an accident at a Chinese-owned copper mine there in 2005 killed over 50 Zambians.
Yet even as African nations fall out of love with Beijing, Western fears have intensified. At closed-door briefing sessions on Africa sponsored by intelligence agencies, I've found nearly every question focuses on negative aspects of China's rise — whether it will undercut efforts to promote better governance in Africa, and whether China's thirst for oil will push out Western firms while boosting Chinese weapon sales to Africa. In part to shore up its position there, the Pentagon has launched a new Africa Command, its first unit designed to focus on the continent.
Some of these worries make sense. In nations like Angola and Chad, Chinese aid has allowed venal governments to ignore multinational donors seeking conditions to ensure that governments buy bread, not BMWs. In a world where easily recoverable oil is dwindling and the price has hit record highs, competition for untapped offshore petroleum in West Africa could spark conflict, with Chinese and Western firms jockeying to build new infrastructure, control ports and woo political leaders. Through its training programs for African technocrats, many of whom return from China amazed, Beijing could indeed promote its authoritarian development model to a continent where democracy still has shallow roots.
But many Western concerns are absurd. As a huge buyer of commodities, China has powered some of Africa's strongest growth since independence — hardly a negative trend. Cheap Chinese consumer goods have also stretched African shoppers' small budgets. Meanwhile, for a nation like France to complain about China's human-rights record on Africa seems beyond a pot-kettle comparison — France has long sponsored African "democrats" like former Central African Republic leader Jean-Bédel Bokassa, who was ultimately convicted of at least 20 murders. Likewise, the U.S. has close ties to Ethiopia's abusive regime, and to oil-rich kleptocracy Equatorial Guinea, whose dictator was welcomed to Washington in 2006 as "a good friend" by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.
Most important, Beijing is learning from African complaints. On subsequent tours, Hu met Chinese businesspeople operating in Africa and warned them to be better attuned to local environments. Beyond plowing aid into infrastructure, China is building softer links — for example, by setting up Chinese-language centers in places like Nairobi.
Even on the most difficult issues, like the genocide in Sudan, where China has supplied military hardware and bought half the country's annual oil output, Beijing is slowly changing. From refusing to discuss Khartoum's atrocities, China now backs the joint peacekeeping force in Darfur. With such reforms, China may yet rekindle its African romance.
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